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How does the introduction of rural public work schemes impact individual incentives
to migrate? This paper examines this question in the context of rural public work
program (Yigong-daizhen) in China, and unveils empirical evidence that suggest that
the introduction of Yigong-daizhen projects in fact stimulates outmigration at the
village level, after controlling for village characteristics, project types and province
fixed effects. By furthermore accounting for the endogeneity of Yigong-daizhen
placement using propensity score matching method, the impact of such projects is
found to be consistent with the OLS estimation. These results are consistent with
household migration behavior in the presence of significant cost of migration, and
credit market imperfection.
JEL codes: H43; J61; O15
Keywords: Public work scheme; Migration; China1. Introduction
A distinctive feature of the Chinese economic growth experience has been the massive
increase in rural migrant work force living in China’s cities since the onset of economic
reforms in the 1980’s. By 2007, the estimated number of rural migrants exceeded over
135 million (Meng et al. 2010). The mobilization of this sizeable workforce has wide-
ranging consequences, including contributions to the growth of export industries
(Chan 2008), shifts in income distribution between urban and rural China (Ha et al.
2009), and changes in educational and health outcomes over time between migrants
and non-migrants (Lee 2011), for example. The depth and breadth of these research
studies concerning the consequences of rural–urban migration in China contrast
sharply with the relatively limited number of studies on the effectiveness of migration
policies in China. Indeed, much of the policy discourse on China’s internal migration
policy has focused on the hukou system of household registration (Chan 2008). As a
first objective of this paper, we examine the role of rural public work schemes as an
alternative migration regulatory mechanism in the Chinese context.
To the best of our knowledge, this is a first attempt at an empirical assessment of
the role of Yigong-daizhen programs on the pattern of migration in China. As a contri-
bution to policy analysis, in view of the massive influx of rural migrants into China’s
urban cities, whether these rural public work schemes serve as deterrents that mitigate
the size of the migrant flow, or in fact further intensify out migration is a question ofChau et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly credited.
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brings together three strands of the literature not often discussed together: labor mar-
ket consequence of public work schemes, determinants of regional migration, and be-
havior in the presence of credit market imperfection.
By a public work scheme, we refer to the public provision of employment opportun-
ities resulting in the creation of public goods, such as roads and schools. These employ-
ment opportunities serve as a form of social safety net, at a prescribed wage for those
unable to find alternative employment. Worldwide, the implementation of public work
schemes spans transition countries, developing countries and developed countries
(Betcherman et al. 2004). A number such public work schemes, such as the Maharash-
tra Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS), and more recently the Mahatma Gandhi
Employment Guarantee Schemes in India, have attracted much academic and policy
attention, (Acharya 1990; Ravallion et al. 1993; Gaiha 1996a, b, 2000; Basu et al. 2009).
Research on the labor market consequences of these more well-known public work
schemes has so far focused on employment, earnings, and targeting.1,2,3
By contrast, the labor market consequence of public work schemes in China is a far
less well-understood topic. Specifically, Yigong-daizhen – to offer job opportunities in-
stead of sheer relief – is a public work scheme initiated in the mid-1980s a part of the
Chinese government’s poverty reduction programs (Rozelle and Park 1998). Research
on the effectiveness of these programs has been very limited. Two exceptions are Park
et al. (2002) and Zhu and Jiang (1995), emphasizing respectively the targeting effective-
ness, and the earnings impact of Yigong-daizhen programs.4,5 While offering valuable
insights, neither of these studies identify program-specific effects due mainly to data
limitation. In addition, identification also requires proper accounting of endogeneity of
program selection among participating villages or county – these are issues that we will
pay particular attention to in our analysis in the sequel.
This paper is also related to a rapidly growing literature on the determinants of inter-
regional migration in China. Some of these determinants include the potential role of
farmland shortages and availability of household labor (Zhao 1999a), earning differ-
ences between destinations and origins (Zhao 1999b; Zhu 2002; Zhang and Song 2003),
as well as the cost of migration (Zhang and Song 2003) whether monetary or psychic
(Sjaastad 1962). At the household level, participating in migration has been shown to
significantly raise per capita income as high as 16 to 43 percent (Taylor et al. 2003).
Open questions abound. In particular, what roles do policies play in regulating the
direction and size of the flow of internal migrants in China? Indeed, how do the direct
provision of employment opportunities and the provision of public goods in rural
villages impact the outflow of migrants from rural areas?6
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on behavior in the presence of credit
market imperfection. In a wide variety of settings, credit market imperfections have been
shown to fundamentally alter the properties of equilibrium, giving rise for example to
non-monotonic, and/or distributionally sensitive comparative statics responses (Galor and
Zeira 1993; Matsuyama 2008). In the context of migration, credit market imperfection is
expected to play a critical role particularly when the upfront cost of migration is signifi-
cant. Indeed, several studies (Du et al. 2005; McKenzie and Rapoport 2007) document an
inverted-U shape relationship between household endowments and migration likelihood.
That is, households with middle wealth are more willing to and able to migrate. Some
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suggest that relaxing financial constraints encourage international migration, particularly
in households in which financial constraints to migration are binding at the margin.
Following the lessons that can be drawn from these three strands of literature, we
argue that Yigong-daizhen programs introduce two opposing forces on the village level
propensity for outmigration. By increasing available employment opportunities and
raising earnings and production efficiency through public goods provision in general,
Yigong-daizhen programs narrows the expected earnings gap between destination and
sending locations, thus potentially discouraging outmigration. Going in the opposite
direction, by raising individual/household’s ability to pay for the cost of migration, due
either to the improvements in earnings thanks to Yigong-daizhen programs in the face
of credit market imperfection that has previously deterred attempts to migrate, or to
public construction that directly decreases the cost of migration by improving transpor-
tation and building roads, public work schemes can in fact stimulate outmigration. On
balance, the net outcome of Yigong-daizhen programs on village level outmigration will
in the end depend on the relative strength of these two effects.7
In this paper, we take this issue to the data using the Center for Chinese Agricultural
Policy (CCAP) 2003 Village Survey, covering 2,459 villages in six provinces in China
(Jiangsu, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Hebei and Jilin in the year of 2003. We are inter-
ested in assessing the outmigration impact of introducing Yigong-daizhen programs at
the village level. In order to identify program-specific effects, we employ a difference in
difference approach. To furthermore account for the issue of endogenous program
selection, we employ a difference in difference propensity score matching method. In a
series of regressions, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that Yigong-daizhen
programs have in fact facilitated the outmigration of workers. Consistent with Du et al.
(2005) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) and the implications of models with signifi-
cant cost of migration and imperfect credit markets, we also find an inverted U-shape
relationship between average per capita income and outmigration at the village level.
Finally, to address the potential heterogeneity of Yigong-daizhen programs across
villages, we compare the impact of Yigong-daizhen in (A) villages with and without
productivity improving public projects, such as irrigation system improvement, drain-
age system improvement, soil improvement, small-scale water conservation and terrace
construction projects, (B) villages with and without migration cost decreasing public
investments through roads and bridge construction projects, and (C) villages with and
without higher program intensity (in terms of number of projects, labor and capital
use). The impacts of Yigong-daizhen programs on outmigration in these specifications
continue to be positive and significant, and especially pronounced in villages with
newly constructed roads, suggesting the potentially critical roles that cost of migration
and credit market imperfections play in the determination of the inter-regional flow of
migrants in China. We also find that the impacts of Yigong-daizhen are larger in
villages with more than one Yigong-daizhen projects, and with above average labor
participation.
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional
background of Yigong-daizhen program in China. Section 3 provides the summary of
statistics of the data used in this paper. Section 4 discusses about the identification
strategy. Section 5 shows the empirical findings and Section 6 concludes.
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The Yigong-daizhen program in China was initiated in the mid-1980s by the Chinese
government as part of the nation’s rural poverty-reduction programs. Table 1 shows the
types of projects, the amount of investment and the achievements of Yigong-daizhen
projects from 1985 to 2000. In terms of program goals, there are mainly four general
categories, including rural land construction and irrigation system construction, road
construction, drinking water facilities improvements and small-scale water conserva-
tion. Forestry and meadow maintenance, river and lake conservation are also included
in the Yigong-daizhen project schemes from 1985 to 1995.
The amount of investment on each category of Yigong-daizhen projects is also presented
in Table 1. Rural land construction, irrigation system construction, as well as road con-
struction take up around 60 per cent of the total investment in 1985–1995, and around 80
per cent of the total investment in 1995–2000. Total investment in Yigong-daizhen projects
is substantial, amounting to 2.62 billion yuan, or around US$ 0.38 billion.
The Chinese central government provided both monetary and in-kind investments.
Table 2 shows the types of in-kind investment made by the government, such as cereals,
cloth, edible oil, grains and medium- and low-grade consumer goods. In the year 2005, the
Regulation of Yigong-daizhen Projects was implemented (National Development and
Reform Commission NDRC 2005). The legislation laid out the regulations that governed
the implementation of Yigong-daizhen projects. Before the end of each calendar year, the
Development and Reform Commission at the provincial level are to report to the National
Development and Reform Commission about project plans for Yigong-daizhen in the
following year. Furthermore, the National Development and Reform Commission are ex-




Rural land construction and
irrigation system construction
1985-1995 7.3 Developed new terraces: 21 million mu;
improve low fertility land: 14 million mu;
improve irrigation: 51 million mu.
Road construction 1985-1995 10.05 Improve rural roads: 214.4 thousands kilometers
Drinking water supply facilities 1985-1995 3.5 Provide drinking water supply for 40.9
million people and 33 million livestocks
Forestry and meadow maintenance,
small-scale water conservation
1985-1995 2.7 Tree Planting: 22.7 million mu; New and
improved meadow: 10 million mu;
Small-scale water conservation:
28 thousands square kilometers
River and Lake Conservation 1991-1995 8 2 billion yuan has been invested annually
since the flood in 1991 to improve the water
condition of several important river and lakes
Rural land construction and
irrigation system construction
1995-2000 10 Rural land construction: 30 million mu;
improve irrigation: 40 million mu.
Drinking water supply facilities 1995-2000 3.5 Provide drinking water supply for about
40 million people and 30 million livestocks
Road construction 1995-2000 9 Improve rural roads: around 100
thousands kilometers
Small-scale water conservation 1995-2000 1.5 Small-scale water conservation: around
30 thousands square kilometers
Source: Documents issued by the National Development and Reform Commission referring to Yigong-daizhen projects,
1985–1995; 1995–2000.
Table 2 Chinese Government investment in Yigong-daizhen Projects, 1984-93
Scheme number Planned period In-kind goods invested Converted value of the goods
1 1984-87 Cereals, cotton and cloth 2.7
2 1989-91 Medium- and low-grade
consumer goods
0.6
3 1990-92 Industrial goods 1.5
4 1991-95 Foodgrains 5
5 1991-95 Foodgrains and industrial goods 10
6 1993-97 Cereals, cloth, edible oil, medium-
and low-grade consumer goods
10
Source: Zhu and Jiang (1995) Table 4.1.
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Regulation of Yigong-daizhen projects stipulates that wages should be paid without delay
and default. In some provinces, such as Sichuan, information on each Yigong-daizhen
project, including source of funding, expected outcomes, as well as implementation year of
the projects are published online and made open for public scrutiny.
The main difference between the Yigong-daizhen programs in China and other public
work schemes, such as the EGS program in India, is the wage rate paid to the employed
workers and the potential impact that this has on inter-regional migration. It is docu-
mented that the wage paid to the unskilled day laborers in the local villages was around
10 yuan (around 1.5 USD) per day during the year 1998 to 2002. This was much lower
than the wage of migrant workers (Luo et al. 2007). For example, in the rural area of
Sichuan province in 1995, an out-migrant helped to increase an average of 2,388 yuan
more of household earnings than a non-migrants per year, relative to an average net
income per capita of 1354.66 yuan and an average household size around 4, or around 10
yuan per day assuming that a worker works five days a week (Zhao 1999a). Thus, a rural–
urban wage gap continued to exist, and remained large despite the introduction of Yigong-
daizhen programs. By contrast, the EGS in Neelamangalam, India, for example, pays the
minimum wage at 80 rupees a days, a figure very close to the day wages of unskilled
migrants, which could be less than 100 rupees a day (Naomi 2008).
3. Data description
The village level data used in this paper is obtained from Center for Chinese Agricul-
tural Policy (CCAP) 2003 Village Survey. It surveyed 2,459 villages in six provinces in
China, namely Jiangsu, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Hebei and Jilin in the year of 2003.
The survey collected a great deal of information about village affairs. In addition to the
basic village characteristics, the survey collected information on village level public
goods investment, governance systems, as well as the general regulatory environment,
such as 1) the attitude of upper government toward violation of One Child Policy, 2)
whether women married into the village are eligible for land allocation and 3) how long
it generally takes to get a license for small business, for example.
As a subset of public investment projects dedicated to alleviating rural poverty in China,
Yigong-daizhen is a public work scheme initiated in 1984.9 The funding of the Yigong-daizhen
projects is allocated to the local governments for local infrastructure construction using local
laborers, where the payment to the laborers accounts for around 20 per cent of the total
funding, at a wage around 10 yuan (around 1.5 USD) per person per day (Luo et al. 2007).
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projects. There are in total 549 Yigong-daizhen projects between 1998 and 2002 in our
sample. Among the 549 projects, 148 (26.96%) projects are roads and bridges construction.
Electricity and drinking water facilities are the second and third popular projects in terms of
the type of the Yigong-daizhen projects. The average investment of a Yigong-daizhen project
is 17,249.05 yuan, and this represents around 11 percent of the average investment of all the
public investment projects. The average labor used of a Yigong-daizhen project is
1,534.51 day laborers per project, which is almost doubled compared to the average labor
used of all the public projects. On average a Yigong-daizhen project benefits 342.9 house-
holds, higher than the average coverage of all the public investment projects.
In addition to the variation in the types of project, the availability of Yigong-daizhen project
also varies across villages in our surveyed sample. Among all the 2,430 villages with valid in-
formation, 2,109 villages do not have access to Yigong-daizhen project; 200 villages have only
one Yigong-daizhen project; 121 villages have more than one such projects, with a maximum
of six projects. On average, 13.2 percent of the surveyed villages receive at least one Yigong-
daizhen project, with variations in different provinces, ranging from 0.8 to 21.8 percent.
It is worth noting that Yigong-daizhen is the only kind of public work scheme in China
which hires local laborers for local public construction with compensation through hourly
wages. Other types of public projects in Chinese villages do not hire local wage laborers,
thus not belonging to public work programs which hire local unemployed people. Instead,
the other projects contract with construction companies outside of the villages. In the
empirical estimation, the type of other public projects available in the villages will beTable 3 Summary of statistics of Yigong-daizhen projects (N = 549)






Roads and bridges 148 18511.72 2406.39 530
School construction 41 13125.61 412.33 –
Build clinic 7 2114.29 124.29 –
Drinking water 56 12552 1007.27 246.13
Irrigation system 61 18196.33 893.53 298.58
Drainage system 15 9240 580 465.73
Electricity 70 36714.75 1320.78 494.35
Telephone 24 35027.27 1820.52 282.45
Cable TV or loudspeaker 5 3320 130 784.6
Soil improvement 16 16713.33 3942 394.88
Small-scale water conservation 19 8894.74 2342.22 337.16
Terrace construction 23 8773.81 1785.7 135.32
Environment improvement 15 6800 461.47 185.6
Forest closure 9 1200 631.11 215.5
Public forest 8 6325 1141.67 423.43
Grain for Green8 24 7378.75 1755.96 249.17
Meadow construction 0 0 0 0
Recreational center 4 5700 107.5 725.5
Not indicated 4 7250 533.33 935.33
All sample 549 17249.05 1534.51 342.9
Chau et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 7 of 202014, 3:4
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/4controlled for in order to correct for the potential impact of different types of other ongoing
projects on migration. However, as non- Yigong-daizhen public projects do not generate
cash income for the local laborers, their impact on migration is likely to be trivial.
The key outcome variable in this paper is the number of migrants in a village. The CCAP
2003 Village Survey collects very detailed information about village demographics and other
characteristics in 1997 and 2002. In the questionnaire, there is a question asking “How
many villagers worked outside, and lived outside in 1997 and 2002.” We use this informa-
tion as a measurement of the number of migrants in a village.
It is worth noting that the village information in 1997 is recalled from the village
head, thus subject to potential recall bias. However, this should not affect the credibility
of our results for two main reasons. First, village officials in China usually maintain very
detailed records about village demographics. For example, it is not a surprise that the
village head knows very well the employment history of each member in the village.
Therefore, the data about village characteristics in 1997 should be trustworthy. Second,
even if the migration data is subject to recall bias, it will not bias our estimation results
as long as it is not correlated with the placement of Yigong-daizhen projects.
4. Econometric issues and identification strategies
4.1 Endogenous program selection
Naturally, whether Yigong-daizhen projects are implemented in a village is likely to de-
pend on village characteristics to begin with. Based on information available from our
sample, Yigong-daizhen projects are more likely to be implemented in villages with
more surplus laborers and less income per capita if it is correctly targeted. Table 4
shows the initial differences in village characteristics by Yigong-daizhen status. Results
from t-tests between the two groups show that villages with Yigong-daizhen projects on
average have significantly lower net income per capita, larger village size (higher total
population), more migrants in terms of both absolute value and share of population,Table 4 Descriptive statistics by Yigong-daizhen status
Village Variables in 1997 All Yigong-daizhen = 1 Yigong-daizhen= 0
Income per capita 1457.83 (973.91) 1367.91* (848.71) 1471.72 (991.29)
Total population 1439.40 (1072.93) 1664.12*** (1178.29) 1404.69 (1051.75)
Number of migrants 91.86 (133.77) 140.23*** (203.20) 84.49 (118.06)
Share of migrants 0.06 (0.06) 0.07*** (0.08) 0.06 (0.06)
Irrigated land (mu) 1107.36 (1724.88) 1184.27 (1754.51) 1095.48 (1720.38)
Proportion of land steeper than 25 degrees (%) 24.52 (29.30) 27.25* (31.84) 24.10 (28.87)
The distance from the village committee
seat to the nearest tarred road
6.75 (23.63) 8.89* (55.85) 6.42 (12.86)
Distance from village committee seat
to township seat
5.38 (5.30) 5.83 (6.08) 5.31 (5.17)
Number of fellow villagers working at township 2.32 (4.46) 2.76** (4.50) 2.25 (4.45)
Illiterate person in 1997 59.52 (110.94) 63.27 (87.32) 58.94 (114.16)
Any tarred road passing through your village?
1 = yes; 2 = no
1.68 (0.47) 1.71 (0.45) 1.67 (0.47)
Observations 2430 325 2105
Notes. ***denotes significant at the 0.01 level; **denotes significant at the 0.05 level; *denotes significant at the 0.1 level.
Standard deviation is reported in the parentheses.
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committee (usually locating near the center of the village) to the nearest tarred road
and more fellow villagers working at township. These suggest strongly that the endo-
geneity of program placement needs to be accounted for in our econometric model.
4.2 Unobserved heterogeneity
Due to data limitation, we do not have information on the implementation of Yigong-
daizhen projects in the surveyed villages prior to year 1997. Thus, it is likely that labor
market equilibrium in the villages was affected not only by the Yigong-daizhen projects
implemented during year 1998–2002, but also by the ones implemented before 1997.
To mitigate the impact of these unobservable differences across villages, we employ a
difference in difference approach using the balanced panel data. Assuming that the long
term impacts of such projects do not vary significantly across years, the resulting esti-
mates should provide an unbiased assessment of the impact of Yigong-daizhen projects.
In view of these econometric issues and identification challenges, we will provide first
a series of baseline OLS regressions of a difference in difference model, which is speci-
fied as follows:








where Outmigi,t is the number of out-migrants in village i, time t.
10 YGDZ is a binary vari-
able that indicates whether Yigong-daizhen projects had been implemented in village i.11
Villagei,t controls for socio-economic, demographic, governance, and transportation related
village level characteristics in year t that we take as proxy for various push factors of migra-
tion. These include net income per capita (yuan in natural log), squared income per capita
(yuan in natural log), the number of illiterates, total population, the distance from village
committee seat to township government seat, the number of fellow villagers working at the
upper government (township government,) and whether there are tarred roads passing
through the village.12 As there were 19 types of public investment projects in the surveyed
villages, Project, ki,t controls for other types of prevailing public investment projects in the
villages via fixed effects, that is, Project, ki,t if a type k project had been implemented in
village i, time t, otherwise Project, ki,t = 0. There were 19 types of other public investment
projects as reported in the questionnaires, which did not hire local labor. Province, j
controls for provincial fixed effects. εi,t is an error term.
13
In order to deal with the endogeneity of the non-random placement of Yigong-
daizhen projects, we will additionally provide estimates based on Difference-
in-Difference Propensity Score Matching and compare the results with the Difference-
in-Difference analysis to test the robustness of our results. Propensity Score Matching
compares the outcomes of treated and untreated individuals by linking individuals with
similar characteristics. Average Treatment Effects (ATE) –which is the causal difference
between the villages with and without Yigong-daizhen program conditional on village
characteristics can be calculated by PSM estimator.
As we have data before and after the Yigong-daizhen program, we use a Difference-
in-Difference Propensity Score Matching (DID-PSM) procedure as our estimation strat-
egy, which is superior to conventional PSM in terms of removing bias from the
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DID-PSM estimator is












where Y1t is the outcome for the treatment group before the treatment; Y
2
t is the out-
come for the treated group after the treatment; Y1c is the outcome for the treatment
group before the treatment; Y2c is the outcome for the treatment group after the treat-
ment; X is the set of control variables. Therefore, the DID-PSM estimator measures the
expected difference between the treatment and control groups, before and after the
Yigong-daizhen program, accounting for observable characteristics.
In the first step of the DID-PSM analysis, we use a probit model to estimate the
probability of Yigong-daizhen program placement on 46 covariates of village character-
istics in the year of 1997.14 We then use the predicted probability from the probit
model as the propensity score of Yigong-daizhen program. That is, a higher propensity
score means a higher probability for a village to implement a Yigong-daizhen program.
Figure 1 shows the common support of the propensity scores with and without Yigong-
daizhen program. The box plot shows that there is a large common support in the two
groups, which is necessary to carry out propensity score matching.
In the second step, we need to find out comparable villages both in the treated and
non-treated groups. To do so, we divide the whole sample into deciles based on the
propensity score. In each decile, we regress all the 46 covariates on the village Yigong-
daizhen status. If the coefficient on Yigong-daizhen is not significant, it means that the
selection of Yigong-daizhen program is random conditional on the specific covariate.
The sample is balanced if that is the case.
Table 5 shows the balanced condition in the ten deciles. It can be seen from the table
that only less than ten percent of the covariates have not been balanced in decile three,
four, five, seven, eight, nine and ten, which is satisfactory. Decile one and two also have






Figure 1 Common support of propensity score by Yigong-daizhen status.
Table 5 Check for balanced condition
Quantile Number of covariates Unbalanced covariates Percentage of unbalance
1 46 6 13.04
2 46 8 17.39
3 46 2 4.35
4 46 2 4.35
5 46 4 8.70
6 46 15 32.61
7 46 0 0.00
8 46 4 8.70
9 46 4 8.70
10 46 1 2.17
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score under this model specification to carry out the DID-PSM estimator.4.3 Heterogeneity by income quartiles
Our empirical estimation tests the impact of Yigong-daizhen on village level outmigra-
tion. As argued earlier in the introduction (Qin 2011), the impact of Yigong-daizhen on
outmigration behavior will depend critically on (i) the cost of migration, and (ii) the
presence of credit market imperfection. With significant upfront cost of migration and
imperfect credit markets, we would expect Yigong-daizhen projects to have a positive
impact on the number of outmigrants in the village. By contrast, if there is perfect
credit market in the village that no households are bound by credit constraints, then
improving employment prospects and earnings via Yigong-daizhen projects should have
the opposing effect of decreasing the number of out-migrants. Importantly, the relative
importance of the cost of migration and of imperfect credit markets is likely dependent
on the average income of the village in question. To capture the potential heterogeneity
in program impact by average per capita income in a village, we will provide quartile
specific estimates of the impact of Yigong-daizhen projects on out-migration.4.4 Heterogeneity by program characteristics
As discussed earlier in Section 1, different public investment projects should be expected
to have different implications on the urban–rural wage gap, and the cost of migration in
the Yigong-daizhen villages. In particular, productivity improving projects such as irriga-
tion system improvement, drainage system improvement, soil improvement, small-scale
water conservation and terrace construction projects may be viewed productivity improv-
ing, potentially narrowing the urban–rural wage gap. Other programs such as road and
bridge construction may be seen more as migration cost reducing. To account for
program-specific heterogeneity across Yigong-daizhen projects, we will do two groups of
comparisons. In the first group, we compare the impact of Yigong-daizhen projects on mi-
gration between villages with five types of ‘productivity improvement’ projects and villages
that lack ‘productivity improvement’ projects. In the second group, we compare the im-
pact of Yigong-daizhen projects between villages with road and bridge construction pro-
jects, and as such, are more likely to experience migration cost reduction, and villages
without road and bridge construction projects during the survey periods.
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tensity of different Yigong-daizhen projects. It is likely that the impact of such projects
should be larger in villages with more numbers of such projects, or more local labor partici-
pation. Therefore, we will compare the impact of Yigong-daizhen projects in villages with
only one such project to the villages with more than one projects. Also, we will compare
the impact in villages with below average labor participation for the Yigong-daizhen projects
to the villages with above average labor participation in these projects.
5. Empirical findings
Table 6 presents the empirical results for the impact of Yigong-daizhen projects on the mi-
gration patterns in the villages. Columns 1–4 display the results of OLS estimation of the
difference in difference (DID) setup. Column 1 is the parsimonious specification without
any control variables, Column 2 controls for village characteristics, Column 3 further
controls for project type fixed effect and Column 4 controls for both project type andTable 6 Impact of Yigong-daizhen project on migrant labor
Dependent variable: change of migrant labor (person)
DID (1) DID (2) DID (3) DID (4) DID-PSM
After 46.19*** 41.79*** 32.68*** 46.44*** –
(1.88) (2.14) (8.45) (7.80)
Yigong-daizhen 55.71*** 38.16*** 38.68*** 5.85 –
(11.62) (9.59) (9.62) (9.17)
After*Yigong-daizhen 40.44*** 40.30*** 36.07*** 38.04*** 12.16*
(7.96) (7.88) (7.61) (7.77) (7.33)
Village Characteristics
Net income (log) −95.39** −41.27 250.25***
(41.26) (42.37) (49.25)
Net income (log) squared 8.24*** 4.2 −19.42***
(3.05) (3.14) (3.70)
Total population (log) 112.41*** 106.97*** 70.76***
(5.19) (5.11) (4.23)
Distance from village to town 0.27 0.17 0.44
(0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Villagers working in township (person) 0.23 0.19 0.9
(1.12) (1.10) (1.07)
Illiterates (person) −0.06** −0.06* 0.12
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Access to road (dummy) 17.61*** 18.95*** 2.27
(5.34) (5.37) (5.03)
Control for:
Types of project No No Yes Yes na
Province FE No No No Yes na
R-squared 0.05 0.32 0.34 0.44 na
N 4858 4858 4858 4858 na
Notes. ***denotes significant at the level 0.01 level; **denotes significant at the 0.05 level; *denotes significant at the 0.1
level. For column 1–4, robust clustered standard errors at the village level are reported in the parentheses; For column 5,
bootstrap standard error is reported for the DID-PSM estimator.
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Column 5 displays the result of the DID-PSM estimation which allows a more flexible
functional form than linear equation. The first two rows for the OLS specification suggest
that the number of out-migrants are significantly higher in year 2002, compared to 1997,
and in villages with Yigong-daizhen projects than without. It can be seen from the third
row of Table 6 that the introduction of Yigong-daizhen projects had a positive and signifi-
cant impact on the number of out-migrants in the village. After controlling for village
characteristics, the types of public project in the village and province fixed effects, the
introduction of Yigong-daizhen projects on average led to an increase of around 38 local
laborers migrating out in the subsequent years as shown in Column 4. The p-value of the
coefficients on Yigong-daizhen projects are below 0.01 for all the four specifications. Given
that the average number of migrants in villages with Yigong-daizhen projects is around
140 in 1997, these public work projects lead to an increase of out-migration by about 27.1
percent from year 1997 to 2002, 5.4 percent per year on average.
Column 5 shows the result of DID-PSM estimation. The estimator calculates the average
treatment effect reweighted by the propensity score, where observations with “extreme”
propensity scores (less than 0.1 and larger than 0.9) have been dropped. The magnitude of
the estimation is lower than the DID specifications with significance at the 0.1 level, indicating
the existence of program selection bias that we may not fully capture in the DID settings.
In addition to the main coefficient related to the impact of Yigong-daizhen, the coeffi-
cients on village characteristics are of interests as well. For example, after accounting
for province fixed effects, the linear term of per capita income in year 1997 is signifi-
cantly positive, while the squared term of per capita income is significantly negative,
which suggests that there exists an inverted U-shape between per capita income and
migration probability. Furthermore, and as should be expected, higher population leads
to more out-migrants in the village. Better road access also encourages out-migration.
Table 7 exhibits OLS (DID) estimation results by different income quartiles. As DID-
PSM estimation requires large sample to construct comparable groups, we do not apply
the method here. The coefficients for Yigong-daizhen are positive and significant except for
the lowest quartile by income in 1997. In addition, the magnitude of the coefficient for the
third quartile is generally the largest among all the four quartiles. These estimates provide
some evidence on credit constraints as the households neither too poor nor too rich are
the most likely ones to migrate out given the cash income from the public work projects.
In addition to income distribution across villages, the income distribution within
villages also affects the migration equilibrium. Yigong-daizhen projects may affect local
laborers in different income quartiles within the village differently in terms of their
willingness to migrate. However, household level data is needed to take into account
the distribution of income within village, which we do not have.
Table 8 presents the results concerning ‘increasing productivity’ and ‘reducing cost’
hypotheses. Panel A tests the hypothesis of ‘increasing productivity’ as a mechanism of
Yigong-daizhen projects. We create a dummy variable “productivity improvement” that
equals to one for villages with five types of ‘productivity improvement’ projects: irriga-
tion system improvement, drainage system improvement, soil improvement, small-scale
water conservation and terrace construction projects. We exclude projects which may
not have effects in the short run, such as school and clinic construction. In addition,
we exclude the Grain for Green projects as they mainly benefit the downstream
Table 7 Impact of Yigong-daizhen project on migrant (by income quartiles)
Dependent variable: number of migrant labor (person)
DID (1) DID (2) DID (3) DID (4)
Lowest quartile by net income in 1997 (N = 1214)
After *Yigong-daizhen 1.91 0.81 −4.50 −4.09
(5.45) (5.63) (5.97) (5.87)
Second lowest quartile by net income in 1997 (N = 1236)
After *Yigong-daizhen 33.63** 32.83** 25.87 33.85**
(13.52) (13.40) (15.86) (15.86)
Second highest quartile by net income in 1997 (N = 1200)
After *Yigong-daizhen 79.70*** 74.52*** 38.08** 57.22***
(15.69) (15.74) (16.29) (15.29)
Highest quartile by net income in 1997 (N = 1206)
After *Yigong-daizhen 48.83** 48.67** 46.76** 48.09**
(23.80) (22.15) (21.05) (21.51)
Control for:
Two main effects for Diff-in-Diff Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village level controls No Yes Yes Yes
Types of project No No Yes Yes
Province FE No No No Yes
Notes. ***denotes significant at the level 0.01 level; **denotes significant at the 0.05 level; *denotes significant at the 0.1
level. Robust clustered standard errors at the village level are reported in the parentheses. The specifications are the
same as reported in Table 6.
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difference in difference term to measure the difference of Yigong-daizhen’s impact in
villages with and without ‘productivity improvement’ projects. All the pairwise interac-
tions and three main effects are included in the regressions but not reported in the
table due to space constraints.Table 8 Impact of Yigong-daizhen project on migrant (hypothesis tests on productivity
improvement and cost reduction)
Dependent variable: number of migrant labor (person)
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4)
Panel A: Productivity improvement
After *Yigong-daizhen *Productivity improvement −10.14 8.02 11.97 22.74
(33.85) (28.18) (27.89) (25.92)
Panel B: Cost reduction
After *Yigong-daizhen *Costs reduction 62.20* 58.17** 58.41** 44.19**
(32.93) (28.60) (28.93) (27.04)
Control for:
Two main effects for Diff-in-Diff Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village level controls No Yes Yes Yes
Types of project No No Yes Yes
Province FE No No No Yes
N 4858 4858 4858 4858
Notes.**denotes significant at the 0.05 level; *denotes significant at the 0.1 level. Robust clustered standard errors at the
village level are reported in the parentheses.
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out-migrants is similar in villages with and without ‘productivity improvement’ projects
since the coefficients are not significant. This suggests that productivity improvement
is not a key mechanism by which public work projects impact the behavior of potential
migrant workers.
Panel B of Table 8 tests the hypothesis of ‘reducing cost’ as a mechanism of Yigong-
daizhen projects. A dummy for “costs reduction” equals to one for villages with road and
bridge construction projects during 1998–2002. These villages are more likely to experi-
ence migration cost reduction through better connectivity to neighbor cities and villages.
The dummy equals to zero in villages without such type of projects. Similar to panel A,
the dummy is interacted with the difference in difference term to measure the difference
of Yigong-daizhen’s impact in villages with and without ‘costs reduction’ projects. Again,
all the pairwise interactions and three main effects are included in the regressions.
The coefficients on the triple difference term are significantly positive and large in
magnitude, which indicates that the positive impact of Yigong-daizhen on out-migration is
much larger in villages with ‘costs reduction’ projects than villages without such projects.
Thus, the above estimates provide us with some confidence that cost reduction may be a
channel for the positive impact of Yigong-daizhen projects on the flow of out-migrants.
Table 9 reports the heterogeneous impacts of Yigong-daizhen projects by program
intensity. There are three dimensions capturing differences in program intensity: the
number of Yigong-daizhen projects implemented in a village; total labor days partici-
pated in such projects; investment in yuan per labor day in such projects. Panel A, B
and C in Table 9 exploit the heterogeneous impacts of Yigong-daizhen projects along
these three dimensions.Table 9 Heterogeneous impact of Yigong-daizhen project on migrant (on number of
project, labor and capital intensity)
Dependent variable: number of migrant labor (person)
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4)
Panel A: One VS. More projects
After *Yigong-daizhen *More than one 50.33*** 50.29*** 49.14*** 51.04***
(17.62) (17.44) (16.86) (17.16)
Panel B: Labor use: Above average VS. Below average
After *Yigong-daizhen *Labor intensive 50.22** 48.77** 44.44** 50.10**
(21.80) (21.64) (21.02) (21.27)
Panel C: Capital use: Above average VS. Below average
After *Yigong-daizhen *Capital intensive 1.78 4.21 10.73 8.72
(32.25) (32.39) (28.89) (30.68)
Control for:
Two main effects for Diff-in-Diff Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village level controls No Yes Yes Yes
Types of project No No Yes Yes
Province FE No No No Yes
N 4858 4858 4858 4858
Notes. ***denotes significant at the level 0.01 level; **denotes significant at the 0.05 level; *denotes significant at the 0.1 level.
Robust clustered standard errors at the village level are reported in the parentheses.
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hen projects in villages with only one such project to villages with more than one pro-
jects. The dummy variable “more than one” equals to one for villages with more than
one Yigong-daizhen projects, otherwise zero. The other specifications are the same as
in Table 8. The consistently positive and significant coefficients across different specifi-
cations indicate that the impact of Yigong-daizhen projects is larger in villages with
higher program intensity, i.e., more number of projects.
Panel B employs similar estimation strategy as in Panel A to compare the impact of
Yigong-daizhen projects in villages with above average labor use for such projects to villages
with below average labor use. The dummy variable “labor intensive” equals to one for
villages with above average labor days participation in Yigong-daizhen projects, otherwise
zero. The positive and significant coefficients in the four specifications indicate that
out-migration flow due to Yigong-daizhen projects is larger in villages with more local labor
participated in such projects. This is reasonable since more labor participation is likely to be
correlated with more local laborers receiving cash income to finance their migration.
Panel C examines the heterogeneous impact of Yigong-daizhen projects along the
dimension of capital intensity using similar estimation strategies following the above
two panels. The dummy variable “capital intensive” equals to one for villages with
above average investment per labor day use, otherwise zero. The coefficients in all the
four specifications are insignificant, suggesting that that impact of Yigong-daizhen pro-
jects is similar in villages with or without capital intensive projects. The result does not
work against our main results since higher capital intensity in Yigong-daizhen projects
does not necessarily lead to more cash income for local laborers nor reduced migration
costs, which are the key channels affecting migration behaviors.
Since the Yigong-daizhen projects in villages ended in different years after year 1997, it will
be interesting to learn about how project timing affects its impact on out-migration. We
create dummy variables for Yigong-daizhen projects that ended in different years in a village
starting from year 1998. If there are projects ended in different years in a village, the ending
year of the earliest one is recorded. The dummies are interacted with the “after” variable to
measure the impact of Yigong-daizhen projects ended in a specific year on out-migration.
The impact of Yigong-daizhen projects ended in 2002 is taken as the baseline group.
Table 10 shows the estimation results. The coefficients reported in the table indicate
the difference of Yigong-daizhen’s impact between projects that ended in a certain year
with projects that ended in the year of the second round of survey (year 2002). 14 out
of the 16 coefficients are positive. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients is larger
for projects that ended earlier. The significance level also increases for older projects.
Therefore, the estimation results suggest that out-migration increases over years after
the ending of the Yigong-daizhen projects.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we present the impact of public work schemes in China, Yigong-daizhen,
on the outmigration of labor at the village level. The results show that the introduction
of Yigong-daizhen projects in the villages stimulates the outflow of migrant workers
from affected villages. The impact of such projects can be consistently estimated using
traditional difference in difference (DID) analysis as well as difference in difference
Table 10 Impact of Yigong-daizhen project on migrant over time
Dependent variable: number of migrant labor (person)
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4)
After *Yigong-daizhen in 1998 101.18*** 69.75** 54.73* 39.85
(37.23) (32.15) (31.59) (30.33)
After *Yigong-daizhen in 1999 74.31* 42.73 26.30 29.24
(44.81) (38.19) (37.64) (35.14)
After *Yigong-daizhen in 2000 38.66 42.99 35.32 38.76
(44.05) (37.70) (38.91) (36.00)
After *Yigong-daizhen in 2001 21.57 8.44 −8.02 −12.11
(34.74) (28.79) (27.62) (24.79)
Control for:
Two main effects for Diff-in-Diff Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village level controls No Yes Yes Yes
Types of project No No Yes Yes
Province FE No No No Yes
N 4858 4858 4858 4858
Notes. ***denotes significant at the level 0.01 level; **denotes significant at the 0.05 level; *denotes significant at the 0.1
level. Robust clustered standard errors at the village level are reported in the parentheses.
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Yigong-daizhen program. These results are consistent with the predictions of a model of
migration behavior in the presence of significant migration cost, and credible market
imperfection (Qin 2011). The positive impact of Yigong-daizhen continues to be robust
upon controlling for potential heterogeneity of program effect across income quartiles.
Specifically, we find evidence suggesting that the impact of Yigong-daizhen on migration
is most important for the middle class, which is consistent with the inverted-U shaped
relationship between migration and income level in the presence of capital market imper-
fect (Du et al. 2005; McKenzie and Rapoport 2007). The positive impact of Yigong-daizhen
remains upon accounting for heterogeneity in program characteristics, most important in
villages with cost reduction projects (such as road construction) and projects with higher
intensity (such as more than one projects and more labor intensive projects.) In addition,
the impact of Yigong-daizhen on migration accumulates over years.
Our findings also reveal two observations that suggest that the present set of results
should be interpreted with caution, and that additional research with better identifica-
tion techniques and broader data coverage should be encouraged. In particular, in the
DID-PSM regression that controls for the program selection on observables, the mag-
nitude and significance of the impact of Yigong-daizhen on out-migration drops to
some extent. Given the data limitations, we cannot fully address concerns about selec-
tion on unobservable characteristics into the program. The estimation result may be
biased upward if some unobservable characteristics are positively correlated with both
the placement of Yigong-daizhen program and migration incentives. For example, if
economic conditions are improved in the prefecture level city that the village belongs
to, the funding for Yigong-daizhen program in the village may increase, and the out-
migrants to the city may increase at the same time, due to the economic growth instead
of the Yigong-daizhen program. In contrast, if the unobservable characteristics are posi-
tively correlated with the placement of Yigong-daizhen program, but negatively
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For example, if the village head is very capable, he (or she) may be able to lobby more
Yigong-daizhen projects to the village. At the same time, if the village head creates
more job opportunities within the village, more local laborers may be willing to stay in
the village instead of migrating out. In this case, our estimation about Yigong-daizhen’s
impact on migration is likely to be downward biased. Alternative identification tech-
niques with better correction for program endogeneity and broader data coverage, for
example, should be applied in future research.Endnotes
1Betcherman et al. (2004) summarizes the impact evaluation results of 20 public work
programs worldwide. The 20 public work programs cover transition countries, developing
countries and developed countries. The results concerning the impact on employment
and earnings are both mixed. Among the 18 studies with impact evaluation on employ-
ment, seven of them find that public work programs have positive impact on the level of
employment. For example, Walsh et al. (2001) investigate the Temporary Employment
Program in the period of 1998 to 1999 in Bulgaria and find that there is a 2.5 per cent net
impact of improving the chance of the unemployed to have a regular job.
2Suggested by Betcherman et al. (2004), of the two studies with impact evaluation on
earnings (Rodríguez-Planas and Jacob 2010; Jalan and Ravallion 2003), the evaluation
evidence regarding to the impact of public works on earnings is mixed for the transi-
tion and developing country programs. For example Rodríguez-Planas and Jacob (2010)
find that in Romania, participating in public work programs has a negative impact on
employment and the length of unemployment spell in the period of 2000–2001. While
according to Jalan and Ravallion (2003), the Trabajar program in Argentina significantly
lifts up the net income of the poor participants, where the percentage net gain for the
poor 5 per cent is 74%. Gaiha (1996b) analyzes the impact of EGS on the wages of the
poor in Maharashtra, India. Program participation is shown to bring significant positive
effect on agricultural wages of the poor possibly since EGS enables them to bargain for
higher agricultural wages by improving their fall-back position. Finally, the study also
finds that EGS program has an income stabilization effect in agriculturally slack
periods.
3Gaiha (1996b) examines the targeting precision of the EGS program. It is expected
that EGS program is designed to help the poor by providing them job opportunities.
However, he finds that the targeting of EGS is no better than the general labor market.
In other words, the share of the poor among EGS participants is close to the share of
the poor in the labor force. This evidence is further confirmed in Gaiha (2000). In
addition, there are more male participants in EGS with a significantly higher wage than
the female participants. Another interesting finding with respect to the participation of
the EGS is that the poor people turn to depend less on EGS, or to be more likely to
withdraw from EGS when the overall economic condition gets better.
4Park et al. (2002) studies the targeting effectiveness of the three main poverty reduc-
tion programs, namely the Yigong-daizhen program, the subsidized loan program and
the budgetary grant program. They find that for both Yigong-daizhen program and the
subsidized loan program, the amount of fund allocation to poor counties is not
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gressive. In addition, they find that being designated as a poor county increases the
growth in rural income per capita by 2.28 per cent per year during the period of 1985–
1992 and 0.91 per cent during the period of 1992–1995.
5Zhu and Jiang (1995) is the only paper that estimates the impact of Yigong-daizhen
program in China with data from three counties. This study finds that Yigong-daizhen
projects have improved the income of participating households. However, they simply
compare the difference of average income per capita between participating and non-
participating households without controlling for village characteristics and accounting
for program placement endogeneity.
6This question has been addressed by Ravallion (1991) for example in the Indian con-
text. Specifically, the initial purpose of the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee
Scheme was to discourage worker migration in the slack seasons and drought affected
years since some workers would not return in the harvest seasons. Also see Naomi
(2008) for evidence on the potential of the National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme in India on outmigration propensities.
7Kanbur (1981) suggests that a rural development program which increases the rural in-
come may indeed increase migration in the villages with imperfect credit market, as the
poor now have more money to spend on migration if the gain from migration is greater
than the earnings from local employment. Qin (2011) narrows down the concept of rural
development programs to public work schemes and provides a theoretical framework to
analyze the impact of such programs on interregional movements of labor.
8The objective of Grain for Green projects is to increase forest cover and prevent soil
erosion on sloped cropland (Uchida et al. 2005).
9There are three main differences between Yigong-daizhen projects and other public
projects in rural China. First and foremost, the funding of Yigong-daizhen projects comes
from the central government, while the funding of the other public projects comes from
either the upper government or the villages themselves. Second, the laborers hired by
Yigong-daizhen projects are the local villagers, unlike the other public projects which
generally outsourcing to companies outside the village. Third, as one of the pro-poor pol-
icy, Yigong-daizhen projects are likely to be placed in villages with more poor population
and less infrastructure (National Development and Reform Commission NDRC 2005).
10As mentioned in Section 3, in the questionnaire, there is a question asking “How
many villagers worked outside, and lived outside in 1997 and 2002.” We use this infor-
mation in village i, time t as the measure of Outmigi,t.
11In the questionnaire, whether Yigong-daizhen program had been implemented in the village
can be detected from the question “the source of funding of the public investment projects”. If
the source of funding of any of the public investment project in village i was from Yigong-
daizhen program, then the variable YGDZi will be coded as “1” for village i, “0” otherwise.
12In China, each township consists of several administrative villages, while each
administrative village consists of several natural villages governed by village committee.
The distance from the village committee seat to township government seat measures
how isolated a natural village is, which is likely to affect the placement of public
projects.
13The 19 types of public projects are: roads and bridges construction, school con-
struction, clinic construction, drinking water facility provision, irrigation system
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telephone installation, cable TV or loudspeaker installation, soil improvement project,
small scale water conservation, terrace construction, environment improvement pro-
ject, forest closure project, public forest planting, Grain for Green project, meadow
construction, recreational center construction and others.
14The 46 covariates include all the village characteristics that can be found in the
questionnaire in the year of 1997, including the number of migrants, the proportion of
households engaged in agricultural production, the proportion of non-minority households,
total population, total acres of land, plain, terrace, irrigated area, sown area, grain produc-
tion, grassland, forest, garden, commercial forest and pond; the number of laborers, local
laborers, commuting laborers, illiterates, residents with high school or higher education,
schools, clinics, village clinics; the number of households with access to electricity, tap
water, telephone; access to paved road (dummy), nearest distance from paved road to the
village committee, the type of road in the village (categorical), the type of vehicle used when
travelling to town (categorical), time used when travelling to town, the proportion of flat
area in the village, hilly area in the village, the level of erosion (categorical), the quality of
grassland (categorical), the type of water resources (categorical), the distance from village to
main water resources, the number of local villagers working in the township government
and working in the county government, any outstanding debt in the village (dummy), the
amount of outstanding debt in the village, the number of enterprises in the village, the
number of village operated enterprises.
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